Vadim Ustyuzhanin

Previous studies have found a positive relationship between the youth and the educated with protest number, but the form that these protests take needs further research. We argue that students are a unique group, acting neither as an educated nor a young population, and three possible mechanisms push students toward non-violent rather than violent forms of protest. By promoting values of tolerance, higher levels of human capital, and social mobility, education serves as a factor that pacifies destructive tendencies in protest movements. At the same time, universities are a platform for cooperation, and the large amounts of free time and energy make the costs of participating in protests for students minimal compared with other groups. Using a negative binomial regression and a rare events logistic regression, we find that the proportion of students is a strong and consistently significant predictor of the number of nonviolent demonstrations. However, the share of students in the total population does not turn out to be significantly associated with violent protests/armed uprisings.

The authors study important aspects of the revolutionary process of the 21st century. The reasons why the revolutionary process of the beginning of the 21st century is going on quite rapidly are considered, as well as forecasts promising that it will be very active in the future; revolutionary trends are analyzed, including a particularly alarming one - the growth in the number of radical Islamist revolutionary uprisings. All of the above is illustrated by a statistical analysis of various types of revolutions. As far as the authors know, there are practically no quantitative studies of the revolutions of the last decades. Meanwhile, this analysis convincingly shows the growing importance of the African countries in the revolutionary process in the World System, the role of which will continue to increase in the future due to the rapid growth of the population and the strengthening of statehood in the region.

Is there a relationship between education and the type of revolutionary action – violent or nonviolent? Past studies found a positive relationship between the education and nonviolence, but the influence that education produces on the form that revolution takes has not yet been explored. We show several possible mechanisms that push the educated population to choose nonviolent tactic: (1) education changes people’s preferences toward peaceful solutions and increases support for civil liberties; (2) it enhances human capital that makes it feasible to use unarmed tactics successfully and (3) it increases the relative costs of engaging in armed action. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the higher education in a country, the higher the probability that revolution will be nonviolent. This paper examines it at a cross-national level with an analysis of 470 NAVCO ‘maximalist campaigns’ and 265 revolutionary events recorded between 1950 and 2020. Overall, we find robust evidence that the higher the level of education in a country, the lower chance that the revolution there would take a violent/armed form.

(1) Introduction. Previous studies in Izhevsk, Novosibirsk, and Kazan have found that non-beverage alcohol is a large part of alcohol consumption in Russia. Whereas those places are relatively high-income cities, there are no studies about such a problem in low-income regions of Russia. The aim of this study is to investigate correlates and factors associated with non-beverage alcohol consumption in eastern regions of Russia, e.g. the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and to assess effectiveness of implementing Russian policies to restrict consumption of non-beverage alcohol. (2) Materials and methods. A survey of adults in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast of Russia was performed on workdays to assess non-beverage drinking patterns in summer 2022. The questionnaire included questions about socio-demographic status and alcohol use, including non-beverage alcohol consumption and drinking patterns. We use logistic regression to identify risk factors of consuming non-beverages. (3) Results. First, ~30% of individuals suffering from alcohol problems drink non-beverage alcohol. Second, those who regularly consume non-beverage alcohol compared with those who chronically drink legal strong alcohol are on average more likely to experience the negative effects of alcohol consumption. Third, income and marriage are the main factors negatively associated with surrogate alcohol consumption. Besides, age shows a curvilinear relationship with that. (4) Conclusions. We suggest that a modified anti-surrogate policy to increase the minimum price of pharmacy alcohol and to enforce restrictions on the sale of non-beverage alcohol is needed in Russia. Such measures could prevent an increase in non-beverage alcohol consumption in Russia against the backdrop of declining real incomes of the population.

In this paper we answer the question, “What features of family organization promote romantic love as a basis for marriage in non-industrial societies?” We also directly address Rosenblatt’s findings and those of a follow up study by Lee and Stone that, counterintuitively, show non-neolocality rather than neolocality to be correlated with love as a basis for marriage. Ember and Levinson and even Lee and Stone have thought this finding to be puzzling. We have recoded Rosenblatt’s original measures on a four-point (0–3) scale: no love, low love, medium love and high love and coded additional cases using ethnographic data taken from eHRAF World Cultures (Human Relations Area Files. https://ehrafworldcultures.yale.edu/). Using these data sets we obtained 109 cultures and tested how post marital residence and marriage types affected the importance of romantic love as a basis for marriage using multiple ordinal regression. Nuclear family organization by itself (including polygynous families) is not significantly correlated with our dependent variable.

In the field of civil war studies, there is now a consensus that the risk of war decreases as average income increases. Nevertheless, such consensus has not been reached in the field of unarmed revolutions, which dominate the revolutionary process of our time. This can be explained by the fact that the researchers assumed a linear effect of income level on the risk of unarmed revolutions’ onset. In contrast, this paper proposes a curvilinear framework that challenges this conventional assumption. It is demonstrated that two opposing trends can be identified within the context of economic development. On the one hand, economic development increases the resources required by the state to prevent illegal displacement and makes revolt costly for potential rebels. Conversely, it develops infrastructure and resources for civil resistance, which gives rise to the politicization of a society and the demand for political rights and participation. Utilizing two independent datasets to define revolutions and employing distinct methodological strategies, I have identified robust support for the inverted "U-shaped" relationship between income level and the risk of unarmed revolutions.